Amusing though the this-is-my-brother-Darryl-this-is-my-other-brother-Darryl set of facts is, it presented to the Court of Appeals the very serious question of where the point comes that a judge is so familiar with a defendant that he must recuse. The Court found no error, but only by a vote of 5-to-4.

I won't rehash the blow-by-blow, since the judges explained themselves more than ably, but from a practitioner's standpoint, I'm wary of taking the majority's ruling and running too far with it. The heart of the case lay at the defendant's allegation that the trial judge had told him that he wished he would be "thrown away;" the judge denied having said that and said that he'd actually told the defendant something much more mundane -- which, in turn, the defendant denied. So from the point of view of a narrow reader, the Court was left with little more than a back-and-forth of he-said, he-said. For the majority (which also noted that the defendant was a habitual offender and, therefore, that the trial court enjoyed no sentencing discretion), that wasn't enough to warrant reversal. But if the defendant had presented uncontradicted proof (or at least proof that was more believable than the rebuttal), then, if you follow a narrow reading, this case would've gone the other way.

In dissent, Judge Carlton views this case through a much larger lens. Whether the trial judge did or didn't say anything, in Judge Carlton's mind, the objective standard by which recusal questions are to be viewed required the judge to step aside.

Whether you view it narrowly or broadly, it's an interesting little case. Given the splintered vote it received on its way out the door, this may not be the case's last show in the Gartin Building.