In dissent, Judge Maxwell, joined by Judge Myers, concedes that the state and federal constitutions guarantee Maye the right to an impartial jury in the county where the crime occurred. But Maxwell concludes that, in this case, the death was so newsworthy and and the charge so serious that it would have been impossible to find an impartial jury in Jefferson Davis County.

Now, obviously, when trial courts encounter irrebuttable presumptions that an impartial jury cannot be impaneled, usually it happens on the defendant's motion to change venue. But does such a conclusion compel a trial judge to hold the trial outside of the crime's venue even when the defendant wants to return? In other words, does the Mississippi Constitution's right to to a "public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed" entitle the defendant to return to the original venue even when an impartial jury cannot be assembled there? Ultimately, Judge Maxwell says that it does not, and that the need for trials by impartial juries overrides a defendant's desire to return home.

The majority opinion doesn't directly address the question, observing instead that "the only justification offered by the trial court [for not granting Maye's request] was a belief that it lacked the authority to return the case to Jefferson County." But viewed against the backdrop of Judge Maxwell's dissent, the majority's holding seems to stand for the proposition that a defendant can waive his right to change venue and avoid a biased jury -- in other words, that a defendant can assert the right, under certain circumstances, to an unfair trial by a tainted jury.